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BACK TO AIR IN DISARRAY?: DISPARITY IN PRACTICES
AND INTERPRETATIONS ON ADIZS DISRUPTING THE
SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION
SANGHOON LEE*

ABSTRACT
The interconnectivity of civil aviation has been long praised
with the success of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) in harmonizing navigation standards and procedures,
along with the utilization of Flight Information Regions (FIRs).
However, continuing geopolitical tensions with different implementations of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) have
belittled the technical achievement. Among different State practices, some ADIZs have expanded beyond territorial airspace
and even overlapped with other FIRs, requiring overflying aircraft to submit flight plans and abide by procedures separate or
in addition to air traffic control obligations.
The purpose of this Article is to review the ongoing political
tensions that are common in issues with ADIZs beyond territorial airspace and to explore different legal schemes put forth by
States. While there is no prevailing rule of law that defines the
scope and procedure of ADIZs, this Article further revisits the
due regard principle under international law and State practices
beyond territorial airspace. Due to its reciprocal characteristic,
this principle does not solely advocate for the coastal State to
arbitrarily put limitations on the freedom of flight beyond its
territorial airspace. Rather, the established FIRs have already
given considerable certainty and accountability to the overflown
State, where the principle also directs both the overflying and
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jalc.87.2.3.
* Researcher, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS),
Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), Republic of Korea; Master in Air
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Author and are not to be construed as representing those of KNDA.

271

272

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

overflown States to actively engage in communication and practices involving liaisons. This principle envisions regional confidence-building measures on aerial communication and the
technical leadership of ICAO to support these States in reducing the relational gap and facilitating civil–military cooperation.

I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

T

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DEFINITION OF ADIZ AND ITS LEGAL
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. DEFINITION OF ADIZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADIZ
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Law of the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Principle of Self-Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The 1944 Chicago Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DISPARITY IN STATE PRACTICES BEYOND
TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. CASES OF ESTABLISHED ADIZ AND THE SAFETY
RISK ON CIVIL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The East China Sea ADIZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Taiwan ADIZ and Flight Route M503 . . . . . . . .
B. THE EP-3 INCIDENT AND THE LEGAL
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE DUE REGARD
PRINCIPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
COMPREHENDING AND FULFILLING THE DUE
REGARD PRINCIPLE TO MITIGATE THE
SAFETY RISK OF ADIZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. IDENTIFYING THE APPLICATION OF THE DUE
REGARD PRINCIPLE BEYOND TERRITORIAL
AIRSPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. TECHNICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
BETWEEN STATES AND THE ROLE OF ICAO FOR
MILITARY–CIVIL AVIATION COOPERATION . . . . . . . .
1. Enhancing State Communication Mechanism for
Civil Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Technical Role of ICAO for Military–Civil
Aviation Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

272
275
276
277
277
279
282
284
284
284
285
286
289
289
293
293
295
297

I. INTRODUCTION
HERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SPEED and interconnectivity
have contributed to the airline industry’s success in achiev-
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ing annual passenger-traffic growth of approximately 5%, which
has not been witnessed in any global industry throughout history.1 While many factors certainly contribute to this ever-succeeding field, the facilitation of air navigation and air traffic
control has led the whole aviation mechanism to function in a
“safe and orderly manner.”2 In particular, the interconnected
communication system between aircraft and air traffic control,
using the Flight Information Regions (FIRs) promulgated by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), has been the
most successful case of cooperation between States to ensure
safety in both the subjacent (including coastal) State and civil
aircraft.3
However, continuing geopolitical tensions with the establishment and different implementations of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) have belittled the technical achievement.
The ongoing disputes in or near the East China Sea and the
South China Sea have raised awareness among States and the
airline industry by alerting aircraft commanders to submit flight
information and equip the necessary radiocommunication systems subject to overlapping ADIZ and FIR procedures.4
1 See Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Facts and Figures: World Aviation and the
World Economy, www.icao.int/sustainability/pages/facts-figures_worldeconomy
data.aspx [https://perma.cc/WMQ2-WGJW]. From 1995 to 2012, annual air traffic growth reached an average of 5%, despite the crises that had impacted the
global economy. Id. According to the report published by the International Air
Traffic Association (IATA), the years 2017-2019 also recorded an annual increase
of 5% on average before the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic. Int’l Air Transp.
Ass’n [IATA], Economic Performance of the Airline Industry: 2019 Mid-Year Report, at 4
(June 2, 2019), www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/airline-industry-economic-performance---june-2019---report/ [https://
perma.cc/B55D-UFBA].
2 The Preamble of the 1944 Chicago Convention states that “the undersigned
governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that
international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically.” Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation pmbl., Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter
Chicago Convention] (emphasis added).
3 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 280–81 (2nd ed.
2017). A FIR is a contiguous zone established under Annex 11 of the 1944 Chicago Convention for the purpose of dividing air traffic services which are provided when an aircraft enters the region. Id. The division of FIRs and the
allocation of air traffic services are irrelevant to States’ control of national airspaces because the objectives of air traffic services are to prevent collisions between aircraft and avoid unnecessary flight delays. See id. at 281.
4 See infra Part III.
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While an ADIZ serves as a tool to anticipate any airborne
threats against national territory, different State implementations of those contiguous zones ultra vires beyond territorial airspace seriously question the role and effectiveness of
international law. Especially when such zones require each aircraft that enters the zone to submit its flight plans, which is repetitive and burdensome, they deflate the airline industry with
unnecessary costs and safety risks.5
This Article aims to review the ongoing political tensions that
are common in ADIZ issues beyond territorial airspace and explore different legal schemes put forth by States under the regime of the high seas. This Article will analyze how States have
established ADIZs and legitimized their arguments based on international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1944 International
Convention on Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). While it is
important for States to protect themselves against and anticipate
any airborne threats to their national security and sovereignty,
several scholars have argued for the lack of a firm legal basis for
setting up such an arbitral zone on the high seas.6
Where there is no prevailing rule of law that defines the scope
and procedure of ADIZs, this Article revisits the due regard
principle under international law and State practices that are
particularly common in establishing ADIZs beyond territorial
airspace. This Article concludes that the principle of due regard
is not a monologue driven by national security; it is a stereophonic instrument to induce bilateral and multilateral communication. In that regard, technical confidence-building measures
that include air liaison mechanisms should be utilized for
civil–military cooperation, while ICAO’s role of reviewing different ADIZ procedures and making it transparent would give
States and the industry a credible amount of certainty. One
would also suggest that ICAO’s role ideally includes facilitating
civil–military cooperation and establishing the best standards
for ADIZs.
5 See, e.g., Roncevert G. Almond, The Weaponization of Airspace: Sovereignty and
Disorder from Above, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 15, 2018), thediplomat.com/2018/10/theweaponization-of-airspace/ [https://perma.cc/HK6X-SG5Y] (expressing that
States in numerous cases have established and utilized ADIZs, “wielding the principle of sovereign airspace as a coercive tool in the grey zone of economic and
diplomatic warfare.”).
6 See infra Section II.B.

2022]
II.

BACK TO AIR IN DISARRAY?

275

DEFINITION OF ADIZ AND ITS LEGAL BACKGROUND

Aviation’s use and development enormously come from a military background.7 With the advent of fighter jets, States have
always expressed their concern for national defense in their sovereign airspace.8 Even after World War II, with the conclusion of
the 1944 Chicago Convention, States have generally agreed to
jurisdiction and control over the airspace that is drawn from
their territorial waters.9 In this sense, Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago Convention reaffirms Article 1 of the Paris Convention of
1919 by recognizing the pre-existing rule of customary international law that “every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”10
However, the Cold War and the Korean War in the 1950s
brought an additional need for States to establish an anticipatory defense system that extends beyond their national airspace.
In particular, enhanced missile capabilities and fighter-jet performances have become a critical threat to national security,
considering that they would reach the coast in minutes, making
it impossible to react duly.11
The United States was the first to establish a surveillance zone
that extended beyond its territorial waters right before the Korean War in 1950 and required aircraft bound to the United
States to communicate their flight plans and purposes.12 This
zone, referred to as an ADIZ, has since then become a contiguous space for approximately 27 States—including Canada, India, Japan, Pakistan, Norway, the United Kingdom, China,
South Korea, and Taiwan13—to identify any flying objects prior
7 See James T. Lowe, The Story of Military Aviation, 2 AIR AFFS. 404, 408, 413, 431,
439 (1948).
8 See infra Section II.B.
9 See Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
10 Id. art. 1. See DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 941, 941 n.33 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 1).
11 See, e.g., Timothy W. Martin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: What
to Know, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-missiles-and-nuclear-weapons-everything-you-need-to-know-11610712018 [https://perma.cc/
C585-TRWJ] (Mar. 16, 2022).
12 See Peter A. Dutton, Comment, Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones
Outside Sovereign Airspace, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 698 (2009) (noting that “[t]he
five ADIZs beyond the U.S. territorial sea were initially established in response to
heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union caused by
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.”).
13 Jinyuan Su, The Practice of States on Air Defense Identification Zones: Geographical
Scope, Object of Identification, and Identification Measures, 18 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 811,
834–35 (2019). Twenty-seven States/regions have established ADIZs: eight States
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to reaching their territorial waters and perhaps as a tool to hold
back other States from reconnoitering around their national
territory.
A.

DEFINITION

OF

ADIZ

According to the Chicago Convention and its pertinent Annexes, the term ADIZ comes from the civil air traffic services
provision.14 Annexes 4 and 15 of the Chicago Convention define
an ADIZ as a “[s]pecial designated airspace of defined dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special
identification and/or reporting procedures additional to those
related to the provision of air traffic services.”15 The legal effect
of ADIZ is not expressed under the Convention and the Annexes, and for the purposes of international civil aviation under
the Chicago Convention system, the ADIZ system is separate and
independent from international and regional air traffic control
procedures; thus, States may exercise an autonomous right to
establish one if needed.16
While the definition and specific procedures of ADIZ may
vary, there have been consistent statements about the term’s
general purpose and function by the establishing States. For instance, according to 14 C.F.R. § 99.3 of the United States, ADIZ
is defined as “an area of airspace over land or water in which the
ready identification, location, and control of all aircraft . . . is
required in the interest of national security.”17 South Korea also
defines ADIZ similarly to the U.S. regulation, where “easy” identification of aircraft is required for national security purposes.
The Act on Operation, Etc. of Military Aircraft of the Republic
of Korea regulates the zone as “a specified airspace defined pursuant to Article 9 over land or water where easy identification,
(Sri Lanka, Poland, Finland, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Libya, and Turkey) have
established zones entirely within their territory; two States (China and Cuba)
have established zones entirely beyond their territory; and seventeen States
(United States, Japan, Canada, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Pakistan,
India, Iran, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Australia, Argentina, Indonesia, Philippines,
Iceland, and Panama) have established zones partly beyond their territory. Id.
14 See ICAO, Annex 4 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Aeronautical
Charts, at 1-1 (11th ed. 2009) [hereinafter ICAO, Annex 4]; ICAO, Annex 15 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation: Aeronautical Information Services, at 1-2
(16th ed. 2015) [hereinafter ICAO, Annex 15].
15 ICAO, Annex 4, supra note 14; ICAO, Annex 15, supra note 14 (emphasis
added).
16 See ICAO, Annex 4, supra note 14; ICAO, Annex 15, supra note 14.
17 FAA Security Control of Air Traffic, 14 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2022).
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location, and control of aircraft are required for the purposes of
national security.”18 Meanwhile, the Designated Airspace Handbook under the Canadian Aviation Regulations19 stipulates “certain rules for the security control of air traffic” when entering
and exiting the zone known as the “[a]irspace of defined dimensions extending upwards from the surface of the earth within
which certain rules for the security control of air traffic apply.”20
In this sense, ADIZ can generally be seen as a zone contiguous
to national airspace established under national legislation,
which ordinarily requires any aircraft to identify itself and to
submit itself to the instructions of the appropriate air traffic controller on the surface for national security.21
Most of the time, ADIZ poses a geopolitical problem more
than a legal problem since many of them do not touch upon
other national territorial waters or compromise regional military
agreements. Rather, as Nicholas Grief well understood, military
and political conflicts have taken place beyond territorial waters—international straits, high seas, and Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs)—that gave rise to the way ADIZs should be interpreted within the context of international law.22
As this Article reviews in the following Section, UNCLOS does
not define ADIZ per se but applies different legal effects as to
different zones that are established under the law. There is no
explicit legal basis as to the establishment of ADIZ. States rather
rely on the due regard principle of aircraft and ships for coastal
States or residual rights since none of the legal instruments explicitly prevent States from establishing such anticipatory zones
for national security purposes.
B.

LEGAL BASIS

ESTABLISHMENT
INTERNATIONAL LAW

FOR THE

OF

ADIZ UNDER

1.

The Law of the Sea
Suppose that a government official from a State is ordered to
review the legality of its national ADIZ that extends beyond its
territorial water. What would one initially choose to look for in
See Act on the Operation, Etc. of Military Aircraft, art. 2 para. 3 (S. Kor.).
Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, s. 602.145(1) (Can.).
20 TRANSP.
CAN., DESIGNATED AIRSPACE HANDBOOK 4 (2021), https://
www.navcanada.ca/en/dah-next-prochaine.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7JJ-JMJR].
21 See JULIAN G. VERPLAETSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN VERTICAL SPACE: AIR,
OUTER SPACE, ETHER 83 (1960).
22 See NICHOLAS GRIEF, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AIRSPACE OF THE
HIGH SEAS 157–58 (1994).
18
19

278

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

terms of an appropriate international framework regulating the
rights and duties in the airspace?
Concerning the law of the sea, UNCLOS would be the initial
reference to review the legal effects in different established
zones: territorial water, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf,
international strait, and others. Regarding the airspace, there is
no direct reference as to the international public rules of different air zones, except that national airspace is above the territorial water, the high seas are free for navigation and use, and
each State’s flight procedures are subject to the Chicago Convention for the safety of civil aviation.23
Article 2 of UNCLOS clearly states that State sovereignty extends to the territorial sea, to the airspace over the territorial
sea, and to its bed and subsoil.24 Therefore, a State can establish
both juris-action and juris-faction within the airspace over the
territorial sea and may also exercise self-defense when an armed
attack occurs in that part of its territory. In this sense, a State can
also establish an air-defense identification system within that airspace over the territorial sea that requires all aircraft, including
the overflying ones, to conform with its national rules regarding
identification and air navigation.
The problem, however, derives from the breadth of such a
request for aerial identification. While Article 3 of UNCLOS
states that “[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth of
its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles,”25
many States have established ADIZs that extend well beyond the
maximum distance.26
For instance, Article 33 of UNCLOS mentions the control of a
State in the contiguous zone for reasons of preventing and punishing “infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations[.]”27 However, the provision does not
state the reason of national security; the International Law Commission also opposed the inclusion of security reasons since “the
vagueness of the term ‘security’ would lead to abuse and that

Chicago Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1, 12.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
25 Id. art. 3.
26 See Su, supra note 13, at 815–18.
27 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 33(1).
23
24
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the right of self-defence would avail a coastal State in the event
of an imminent and direct threat to its national security.”28
Another argument in favor of identifying flights outside national airspace would be that coastal States are given specific
rights in the EEZs vested under UNCLOS. According to Article
56 of the Convention, the coastal State has sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in the EEZ to explore and exploit natural resources,
establish and use artificial islands, and protect and preserve the
marine environment.29 While other States retain the right to
navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines under Article 58 and Article 87 of the Convention,
those States “shall have due regard to the rights and duties of
the coastal State.”30
As this Article reviews, coastal States argue that certain limitations and restrictions apply to flights entering the EEZ based on
the rights specified under the above provisions.31 In particular,
coastal States persistently call upon other States to exercise the
principle of due regard for the rights of the coastal States in the
EEZ and argue that the overflying aircraft also need to submit a
flight plan when entering the zone regardless of the FIR procedures.32 This Article will separately review the different instances
that demonstrate disparities among State implementations of
national security measures outside territorial airspace and will
revisit the principle regarding those exercises.
2.

The Principle of Self-Defense

John T. Murchison argued during the early 1950s that the status of contiguous zones is not clearly defined as to whether it is
res communis or res nullius.33 Thus, Murchison argued that the
airspace above that zone should also enjoy that status while bearing in mind that aviation is a completely new transport medium.34 He then further based his argument justifying ADIZ on
28 GRIEF, supra note 22, at 153 (citing Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of
Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/3159, at 295, Commentary to Draft Article 66 ¶ 4,
(1956), in 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INT’L LAW COMM’N (1956)).
29 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 56(1)(a)–(b).
30 Id. arts. 58, 87(1).
31 See infra Sections III.B, IV.A.
32 See infra Sections III.B, IV.A.
33 JOHN TAYLOR MURCHISON, THE CONTIGUOUS AIR SPACE ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (1957).
34 See id.
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the principle of necessity and self-preservation that is rooted in
the jurisprudence of the Caroline case from 1841:
It is no secret that anti-aircraft guns, even the most modern ones,
are no longer any defence against an attack of this nature for the
very reason that if the bomber is within range of the guns it is
already too close and the damage will have been done. The only
effective defence, therefore, is interception and destruction by
defending fighter aircraft or guided missiles . . . Such a defence
depends vitally on adequate identification in point of time.
The very existence of the State makes these identification zones
seaward a necessity.35

However, the principle of necessity and self-preservation cannot be applied to allow a State to establish a zone that applies its
rules and regulations to every coast far beyond its territorial waters. According to the early Caroline case in 1841, Daniel Webster, then-Secretary of State, argued that the attack within the
territory of the United States by the British government was not
legitimate, and that the British government had the onus to
prove that the necessity of anticipatory self-defense was “instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation . . . [T]he act[, even if] justified by the necessity of
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it.”36
There have been some discussions about whether self-preservation differs from anticipatory self-defense during the dispute
in the case.37 However, R. Y. Jennings observed that “throughout
the dispute there does not seem to have been any disagreement
as to the law involved” and thus, the notion of self-preservation—or locus classicus of the law of self-defense—cannot also
escape its limitation of necessity.38 This would mean that even
35 Id. at 56. Meanwhile, John Cobb Cooper also advocates for this theory that
the high seas would appear to be subject to “the principle that every sovereign
State may, under certain circumstances, act beyond the limits of its territory to
assure itself from injury.” See John Cobb Cooper, Space Above the Seas, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 1946-1966 194, 198 (Ivan A. Vlasic ed.,
1968).
36 Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States, Respecting
the Arrest and Imprisonment of Mr. McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline (Apr. 24, 1841), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1842d.asp [https://perma.cc/5TGY-B8WJ].
37 See, e.g., R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82,
91 (1938).
38 Id. at 92. To be specific, Jennings stated, “Most important of all, the conception was rescued from the Naturalist notions of an absolute primordial right of
self-preservation, which still vitiated the doctrine of the writers, and was subjected
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when one establishes an ADIZ based on the principle of selfpreservation, the establishment must be a necessary action in
response to a situation that is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”39
On the other hand, the concept of such anticipatory self-defense has been controversial among scholars as to whether it
should be regarded as customary international law and whether
Article 51 of the UN Charter can be interpreted to allow such
future-based self-defense.40 Even States that have asserted such a
right do not seem as if they have had consistent State practices
or opinio juris.41 Nonetheless, the equation can only be drawn
when there is a future or anticipated threat of an “armed attack,” which triggers “self-defense.”
The mere installation of ADIZ on every coast of the State cannot be regarded as an action of self-defense since there is no
link to an armed attack or even an “aggression.” For instance,
W. Michael Reisman reviewed the U.S. blockade of Cuba during
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and argued that preemptive selfdefense is “an asserted legal right to use offensive military force
against a target that does not yet, but may in the future, pose a
threat,” concluding that the blockade could be characterized as
either preemptive conduct or a means of self-defense, but not
preemptive self-defense.42
Interestingly, Li Juqian further argues that the establishment
of an ADIZ cannot even be considered a measure of national
defense, based on the idea that a State’s jurisdiction can only be
expanded beyond its national territory when the rights of the
State or the citizens of that State have been infringed by foreignto the limiting condition of necessity; and necessity is nowhere more carefully
defined than in Webster’s letter to Fox.” Id.
39 See Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States, supra note
36.
40 JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSENTIALS OF CANADIAN LAW
521 (2d ed. 2008).
41 Id. at 524. Currie remarks,
What is striking about all of this—with the exception of Israel’s
stance against Iraq in 1981—is that it at best evidences opinio juris
divorced from [S]tate practice, or [S]tate practice divorced from
opinio juris. Given that customary international law is formed or evidenced by general and consistent [S]tate practice accompanied by
opinio juris, it must be admitted that the evidence supporting a customary right of anticipatory self-defence is very scanty indeed.
Id.
42 W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, Centennial Essay: The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 527 n.7 (2006).
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ers or a foreign country according to that State’s penal law (this
is also referred to as “protective jurisdiction”).43
Therefore, Murchison’s assertion that ADIZ is based on necessity and a state’s preservation of its national defense cannot be
justified under the rules of international law. Rather, ADIZ can
only be regarded as an autonomous national defense measure.
3.

The 1944 Chicago Convention

Meanwhile, the Chicago Convention stipulates the exclusive
and sovereign right of the State to its national airspace.44 In that
regard, scheduled commercial and State aircraft must obtain authorization from the other State for overflight or landing above
that State’s territory.45 Moreover, as states have agreed that the
rules applied on the high seas shall be those established under
this Convention,46 the pertinent Annexes specify flight rules for
civil operations in international airspace above the high seas.
For example, Annex 2 “Rules of the Air” describes the procedures and standards for identification and control of aircraft in
the air, which are applied to the high seas without exception.47
Rule 3.3.1.1 prescribes that the information relative to an intended flight or portion of a flight that is provided to air traffic
service units “shall be in the form of a flight plan.”48 Accordingly, a flight plan shall be submitted prior to operating any
flight or portion thereof that will require air traffic control service, any Instrument Flight Rules (IFRs), any flight within advisory airspace, any flight within or into designated areas or along
designated routes when so required by the appropriate air traffic service authority, or any flight across international borders.49
43 See Li Juqian, Air Defense Identification Zone: The Restriction on the Free Sky Due to
the Residual Right Principle, 2 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 12, 25 (2014). On the other hand,
protective jurisdiction can only be attached to the person or the entity of a State
that has committed a crime under another State’s penal code, while an ADIZ is a
fixed area that gives legal effect under a State’s regulation to any aircraft that
enters the zone. In that regard, not all measures of national defense are necessarily bound to such a jurisdictional issue, and as this author reviews in the paper,
an ADIZ does not seem to be an issue that concerns a jurisdictional dispute but
rather concerns the issue of due regard of the coastal State. See id. at 22.
44 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art.1.
45 Id. arts. 3(c), 6.
46 Id. art. 12.
47 ICAO, Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Rules of the Air,
at v (10th ed. 2005).
48 Id. at 3-4.
49 Id.
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Furthermore, Annex 11 assigns a standardized rule for air
traffic systems in international airspace and imposes responsibility on its member states to abide by those procedures for the
safety and security of civil aviation.50 In this sense, an FIR, which
is “[a]n airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting service are provided,”51 is set and
managed by ICAO.
One might observe that regarding the obligations to file a
plan and give position reports, the procedure when one enters
an ADIZ would also be consistent with ICAO’s rules of the air.
Nicholas Grief specified that under ICAO rules,
[The] flight plan must be submitted prior to operating any flight
to be provided with air traffic control service; any flight across
international borders; and any flight within designated areas
when so required by the appropriate Air Traffic Services authority in order to facilitate co-ordination with military units and thus
avoid the need for interception for the purpose of
identification.52

However, the above ICAO standards are limited to technical
and operational considerations and do not impose any sovereignty or security rights on any State. For instance, the purpose
of establishing an FIR is solely for the facilitation of air traffic
services—it is thus recommended that the delineation of airspace “should be related to the nature of the route structure
and the need for efficient service rather than to national boundaries.”53 Also, when a State delegates to another State the responsibility for establishing and providing air traffic services in
FIRs, the providing State’s responsibility is limited to technical
and operational considerations.54
While ICAO standards require all aircraft to submit their
flight information seamlessly along their flight route, they are
certainly apart from domestic security considerations. Thus,
States would still maintain their claim to require flight information based on temporal and spatial conditions under their domestic legislation.
50 ICAO, Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Air Traffic
Services, at ix (15th ed. 2018).
51 Id. at 1-8.
52 GRIEF, supra note 22, at 154 (citing Annex 2 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation: Rules of the Air, supra note 47, at 3-7 to 3-8).
53 See Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Air Traffic Services,
supra note 50, at 2-6.
54 Id. at 2-1.
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DISPARITY IN STATE PRACTICES BEYOND
TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE

CASES

OF

ESTABLISHED ADIZ AND
CIVIL AVIATION

THE

SAFETY RISK

ON

The East China Sea ADIZ

A careful analysis is always needed in measuring and reviewing the geopolitical situation. China, Japan, and Korea had been
in frequent conflict with regard to maritime disputes in the East
China Sea until a full-fledged polemic unfolded when China declared its new ADIZ in the East China Sea (the ECS ADIZ) in
November 2013, specifically covering the disputed Senkaku (or
Diaoyu) Islands.55
The United States and Japan promptly condemned China’s
unilateral establishment, with the United States flying unarmed
bombers through the airspace and Japan instructing its civilian
airlines not to comply with the requirements of this new ADIZ.56
A few days after the establishment of the ECS ADIZ, ANA, Japan
Airlines Co. (JAL), and Peach Aviation flights flew through the
declared zone without notifying China about its flight information, while other countries’ air carriers awaited their government’s guidance.57 According to the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), the creation of the zone had not immediately affected the operations of commercial flights, but some airlines had to file flight plans manually until the issuance of
official guidance.58
China, on the other hand, stated that (i) ECS ADIZ was a
measure to protect its State sovereignty and territorial airspace
security, and (ii) the establishment of ADIZ varies by State and,
since the Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone (JADIZ) extended to 130 km towards China’s coastline from its west end,
55 Chris Buckley, China Claims Air Rights over Disputed Islands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
23, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/china-warns-of-actionagainst-aircraft-over-disputed-seas.html [https://perma.cc/8MTC-69ZQ].
56 Mark Felsenthal & David Alexander, U.S. Affirms Support for Japan in Islands
Dispute with China, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2013, 9:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-china/u-s-affirms-support-for-japan-in-islands-dispute-with-chinaidUSBRE9AQ0T920131128 [https://perma.cc/F9UC-WCX2]. See also ANA, JAL,
Peach Now Disregard China ADIZ, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 27, 2013),
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/27/business/corporate-business/ana-jalpeach-now-disregard-china-adiz/ [https://perma.cc/8976-PPUN].
57 See JAPAN TIMES, supra note 56.
58 See id.

2022]

BACK TO AIR IN DISARRAY?

285

Japan and the United States were not qualified to “make irresponsible remarks on China’s lawful and rational act.”59
Accordingly, South Korea expanded its ADIZ (KADIZ) two
weeks after China’s declaration, covering the southern Ieodo
Reef.60 The expanded air defense zone followed the boundaries
of South Korea’s FIR, having no impact on civilian flights in
terms of submitting flight information when entering.61 While
some have raised concerns of heightening military tensions due
to the overlap of ECS ADIZ, KADIZ, and JADIZ, there was no
immediate antagonistic response from China or Japan.62
2.

Taiwan ADIZ and Flight Route M503

In the case of the South China Sea, there has not been any
recent declaration of an ADIZ by any regional State ever since
the Philippine ADIZ was established in 1954.63 Rather, a contrary case occurred when China declared an expansion of its
civil-flight route that passes the Taiwanese ADIZ, absent prior
consultation with the Taiwan civil-aviation authority.64
In January 2018, China’s Civil Aviation Administration announced a modification of its flight route M503, which was originally a southbound route that passed the Taiwan Strait and
covered the northbound route.65 With both directions applied,
civil flights would be able to serve the cities of Xiamen, Fuzhou
efficiently, and Dongshan, both inbound and outbound.66 The
Taiwanese authority condemned such unilateral action, only to
be dismissed by Chinese government officials who argued that
they did not need permission since the flight route is under
59 Geng Yansheng, Defense Ministry Spokesman, Statement on China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) (Dec. 3, 2013), www.chinamission.be/eng/
more/dhfksbq13/t1109762.htm [https://perma.cc/8RPL-NACV].
60 See Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Announces Expansion of Its Air Defense Zone,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/world/asia/eastchina-sea-air-defense-zone.html [https://perma.cc/5HHM-CDS8].
61 Id.
62 See id.; Ankit Panda, The East China ADIZ and the Curious Case of South Korea,
DIPLOMAT (Nov.28, 2013), https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-east-chinaadiz-and-the-curious-case-of-south-korea/ [https://perma.cc/J7QD-RPVE].
63 See Su, supra note 13, at 816–17.
64 A Primer on M503 and Civil Aviation in Asia, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://amti.csis.org/primer-m503-civil-aviation-asia/
[https://perma.cc/J4JD-QSJH].
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Shanghai’s FIR and “involves no Taiwan flight route or destination and will not affect Taiwan flight safety.”67
The Taiwanese authority based its assertion under Part I, Section 2, Item 4.2.6 of ICAO’s Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, which states that changes to the network should only be
made after they have been coordinated with all parties concerned.68 While the issue triggered the ICAO to provide mediation, since it is responsible for coordinating the rules and
procedures of the air traffic system, the organization seemed reluctant to resolve the matter as it could be exacerbated into a
political conflict.69
Meanwhile, the new M503 route passes through the
Taiwanese ADIZ. While the original route had been agreed to
by both parties in 2015 and was then managed under ICAO’s
supervision, China’s unilateral expansion of the air traffic route
in 2018 had promptly caused the Taiwanese air transport control to halt Chinese flights using M503 and suspend applications
for additional charter flights.70 Where it is debatable whether
China had failed to exercise due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft in the region, ICAO had certainly failed to
abide by the Chicago Convention in which it had been undersigned to ensure international civil aviation develops in a safe
and orderly manner.71
B.

THE EP-3 INCIDENT AND THE LEGAL CHARACTERISTIC
THE DUE REGARD PRINCIPLE

OF

The controversial principle of due regard with coastal States
versus freedom of flights is well-demonstrated in the famous EP3 incident between the United States and China. On April 1,
2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in the airspace above China’s EEZ in the South
Id.
ICAO, Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, at I-2-4-2, ICAO Doc. 9426-AN/
924 (1st ed. 1984) (“Once the route network has been established or reviewed in
accordance with the above, the detailed ATS route network should be reviewed as
a whole to evaluate its coherence. Changes to the network should be made only
after they have been co-ordinated with all parties concerned.”).
69 See Stacy Hsu, Flight Route Stance Declared to ICAO, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 10,
2018), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/01/10/
2003685506 [https://perma.cc/XZ5T-Y299].
70 Chiu Bihui, China vs. Taiwan – Controversy over Flight Route M503, DW (Feb.
2, 2018), www.dw.com/en/china-vs-taiwan-controversy-over-flight-route-m503/a42430594 [https://perma.cc/CMR2-EY7F].
71 See Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at pmbl.
67
68
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China Sea.72 While the United States had argued that its EP-3
was exercising a routine surveillance mission in the international airspace, China had argued that the flight was approaching its territorial waters off the city of Sanya, dispatching two
fighter jets to monitor the plane.73 Both States strongly accused
each other of the dangerous maneuvers despite their casual
practice.74
The core issue in this case is that both States alleged their
rights based on contradictory principles under international
law. The United States argued that the EP-3 “was flying an overt
reconnaissance and surveillance mission, in international space,
in an aircraft clearly marked as ‘United States Navy,’” which is
an understood freedom under international law.75 The U.S. government then posited that the coastal State’s interception
should usually end up with short communication and a safe return to each base, despite the United States’ potential threat to
the coastal State’s national security.76 Then-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated in his briefing:
We had every right to be flying where we were flying. They
have every right to come up and observe our flight. What one
does not have the right to do, and nor do I think it was anyone’s
intention, is to fly into another aircraft.
...
. . . There frequently is a period where there is some sort of
hand signals or communications between them. And they go
about their business.
There is no reason to believe that suddenly the pattern or
rhythm of planes flying surveillance and reconnaissance flights,
and their being intercepted is going to end up in some pilot
crashing into another airplane.77

John Bellflower also argued for the United States by stating
that China’s interception against routine military exercises
72 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Turkey, Spokesman Zhu Bangzao Gives Full Account of the Collision between US and Chinese Military
Planes, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFS. (Apr. 4, 2001), tr.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/
t160956.htm [https://perma.cc/A5KP-VA2D].
73 Id.
74 See id.; Transcript of News Briefing: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CNN
(Apr. 13, 2001, 2:00 PM), transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2001-04-13/segment/02 [https://perma.cc/8ZU2-7EW7].
75 CNN, supra note 74.
76 See id.
77 Id.
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lacked safety standards and routinely failed to exercise “due regard” for the safety of aerial navigation.78
On the other hand, China accounted for the United States
violating the due regard principle when exercising its freedom
of overflight near China’s coastal areas.79 The spokesman of the
Chinese government made its statement:
[T]he US military surveillance plane violated the principle of
“free over-flight,” because the incident incurred by the US plane
happened in airspace near China’s coastal areas and China’s exclusive economic waters. . . [T]he Convention and general international law stipulate at the same time that the rights of the
coastal country should be considered. The US surveillance
plane’s reconnaissance acts were targeted at China in the airspace over China’s coastal area and its flight was far beyond the
scope of “over-flight,” and thus abused the principle of overflight freedom.80

The Chinese government expressly based its argument under
Article 58 of UNCLOS, which says that while States enjoy the
freedom of navigation and overflight in a State’s EEZ, they shall
have “due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State
and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law.”81
It is important to note that the principle of due regard can
always be a double-edged sword, especially when there is no superior right ensured on the high seas. When applying the limitation of “peaceful purposes” on the freedom of use of the high
seas under Article 88 of UNCLOS, Eric Donnelly observed that
while the Chinese government considered U.S. activities to not
be taking due regard or for a peaceful purpose, the Chinese
government weakens its legal argument on an equitable basis
because it practices surveillance on the high seas.82
While there are never-ending contentions on the validity of
military practices and the intercept activity between those States
concerned in the South and the East China Sea, the aforemen78 John W. Bellflower, Contested Airspace: The Legality of Military Use of Airspace
Above the Exclusive Economic Zone, 39 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 247, 259 (2014).
79 See id. at 260–61.
80 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Turkey, supra
note 72.
81 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 58(2)–(3).
82 See Eric Donnelly, The United States–China EP-3 Incident: Legality and Realpolitik, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 25, 32–33 (2004).
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tioned disruptions in aerial navigation could invite potential
military conflicts and pose a safety threat to civil aviation. Such
power games cannot take civil aviation hostage. In peacetime,
safety must be guaranteed to civil aircraft, and other member
states must criticize any inconsistency of ADIZ procedures to
civil aircraft in the agora of ICAO.
In the final chapter, this Article will revisit the due regard
principle under general international law and identify how it
could apply to State activities outside national airspace. Furthermore, in mitigating the legal and political uncertainty which
stemmed from the different State practices and unilateral establishment of ADIZ on the high seas, this Article will review the
utility of several confidence-building measures, including liaison
mechanisms. In this case, ICAO’s technical role will be further
examined in reducing the procedural gap between FIR and
ADIZ in order to achieve safe and harmonious civil aviation.
IV. COMPREHENDING AND FULFILLING THE DUE
REGARD PRINCIPLE TO MITIGATE THE SAFETY
RISK OF ADIZ
A.

IDENTIFYING THE APPLICATION OF THE DUE REGARD
PRINCIPLE BEYOND TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE

The duty of due regard is one of the most general principles
that directs a State exercising its rights or duties to consider an
affected State’s rights or duties.83 Its codification mostly appears
under UNCLOS, which stipulates that a State should follow the
provisions when exercising its rights on the high seas or approaching another coastal State.84
See, e.g., Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Due Regard’ Obligations, with Particular Emphasis on
Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 34 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 56, 56–57
(2019). The basic principle of self-restraint appears in the commentary of the
draft of Article 27 covering the freedom of the high Seas, which says “States are
bound to refrain from any acts which might adversely affect the use of the high
seas by nationals of other States.” Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 28, at 278, Commentary to Draft Article 27 ¶ 1. This later became codified as the principle of
reasonable regard in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the principle of
due regard in UNCLOS. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Principle of Due Regard, in
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA TO
THE RULE OF LAW: 1996-2016, at 108, 108–09 (2018).
84 For all due regard principles that appear in the context of a State’s rights
and duties when performing certain activities within certain areas defined under
UNCLOS—territorial seas, international straits, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, high seas, and international seabeds—see UNCLOS, supra note
83
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According to Article 87(2) of UNCLOS, the freedom of the
high seas “shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom.”85 Similarly, Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas also
states that the freedom of the high seas “shall be exercised by all
States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom.”86
While it is generally understood that this principle is elusive
and open-texture, it provides flexibility in every circumstance it
is applied;87 Joanna Mossop stated that the rights and duties of
the coastal State and those of other States must coexist on the
high seas and the EEZ like other areas regulated under
UNCLOS.88
Furthermore, Zang Goubin understood that the principle in
the high seas is “an active legal directive instead of a merely passive obligation.”89 In that regard, the Arbitral Tribunal for the
Chagos Marine Protected Area case (Chagos Award) also considered
the active nature of the principle despite the lack of any uniform obligation:
In the Tribunal’s view, the ordinary meaning of “due regard”
calls for the United Kingdom to have such regard for the rights
of Mauritius as is called for by the circumstances and by the nature of those rights. The Tribunal declines to find in this formulation any universal rule of conduct. The Convention does not
24, arts. 27(4), 39(3)(a), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a), 79(5), 87(2), 142(1), 148,
234, 267.
85 Id. art. 87(2).
86 United Nations Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S.
11 (emphasis added). The freedom and rule on the high seas traces back to the
Grotian concept of mare clausum from the seventeenth century. See Zhang
Guobin, A Discussion on “Due Regard” in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 2014 CHINA OCEANS L. REV. 70, 74 (2014). In this case, the terms “due
regard” and “reasonable regard” would convey the same meaning, identified as a
foundational principle in modern international law. See id. at 75.
87 See Julia Gaunce, On the Interpretation of the General Duty of “Due Regard,” in 32
OCEAN YEARBOOK 27, 27–28 (Aldo Chircop, Scott Coffen-Smout & Moira L. McConnell eds., 2018). The test of due diligence is accepted as the most appropriate
standard to hold States accountable for breaches of obligations specified in particular instruments; although, it is less clear what the principle actually means,
and the standard differs among specific provisions. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 426 (6th ed. 2003) (stating that tribunals can set
“due diligence” standards but oftentimes relate to States’ actions and issues of
causation).
88 JOANNA MOSSOP, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES:
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 182 (2016).
89 Goubin, supra note 86, at 78.
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impose a uniform obligation to avoid any impairment of Mauritius’ rights; nor does it uniformly permit the United Kingdom to
proceed as it wishes, merely noting such rights.90

In this sense, the due regard principle under UNCLOS cannot be regarded as a power conferred to a coastal State to selectively authorize the activities of other States. Rather, due regard
is a principle that guides States to refrain from or actively engage in an action that will have international effects. In the
Chagos Award, the tribunal gave further practical advice on this
aspect of State relations; it observed that more meetings or consultations could have satisfied one State’s obligation to have
“due regard” for the other State.91
The tribunal accepted the United Kingdom’s argument that
“consultation need not continue indefinitely or ‘until the other
party is happy,’” but concluded that “the United Kingdom created an expectation that further bilateral consultation ‘about
the ideas [would take place] beforehand’ and that Mauritius
would be offered a further opportunity for discussion before a
final decision was taken.”92 Since the United Kingdom announced its decision to establish a Marine Protected Area
shortly after assuring Mauritius that there would be continued
dialogue, the tribunal found it “difficult to reconcile [such]
course of events with the spirit of negotiation and consultation
or with the need to balance the interests at stake in the waters of
the Archipelago.”93
On the other hand, this principle would be even harder to
apply when States have conflicts in an EEZ. As China had argued, Article 58(3) obliges the overflying State to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.94 However, the
provision itself is articulated under the rules on EEZs, with limited jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research,
and the protection and preservation of the marine environ90 In re the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA
Case Repository No. 2011-03, Award, ¶ 519 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter
Chagos Award], https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20
Award.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQE8-Y59N].
91 See id. ¶ 530.
92 Id. ¶ 531.
93 Id.
94 See Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Turkey,
supra note 72.
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ment.95 Eric Donnelly viewed the provisions of the EEZ as exclusively resource-related, concluding that the U.S. surveillance
aircraft did not violate freedoms of flight while over China’s
EEZ.96 Tullio Scovazzi also stated that:
Within the exclusive economic zone, where the applicable regime is the result of the balancing of the rights of the coastal
[S]tate with those of other [S]tates, international practice shows
that the balance shifts in favour of the coastal [S]tate if conflicting fishing activities are at stake. The balance may change if
other kinds of activities are in conflict within the same zone.97

Moreover, Kay Hailbronner focused on the concept of the
“Castaneda formula” given under Article 59 of UNCLOS, which
states that when conflict arises between the coastal State and
other States over the EEZ concerning rights or jurisdiction that
the Convention did not specify, “the conflict should be resolved
on the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances.”98 He argued that the concept “does not justify restrictions of the traditional freedom of overflight,” and “[t]herefore,
a third [S]tate would not be precluded by Article 59 from claiming a right to peaceful military uses of the airspace above the
EEZ under Articles 58 and 88.”99
Hence, the legal implication is that when the due regard principle applies to overflying aircraft, it provides the coastal State
the authority to apply its national rules and regulations to overflying aircraft in the EEZ so that it does not overwhelm the same
right of the other State. At a minimum, the exercise of the authority should not unjustifiably interfere with the operations of
aircraft and ships. Therefore, considering that the facilitation of
the FIR system has already given considerable certainty and accountability to the overflown State in terms of safety and security, the establishment of ADIZ cannot go further than the FIR
requirements. However, one must note that the scope of discussion can only be limited to civil aircraft, and thus, State aircraft
can be interfered with in terms of the due regard principle that
is reciprocal to the other State.
In this sense, the facilitation of cooperation between civil and
military air traffic controllers would once again be important to
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 56(1)(b).
Donnelly, supra note 82, at 35.
97 Scovazzi, supra note 83, at 72.
98 Kay Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 490, 505 (1983).
99 Id.
95
96
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avoid impediments to civil aviation from expanding ADIZs and
other air-defense procedures.
B.

1.

TECHNICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN
STATES AND THE ROLE OF ICAO FOR MILITARY–CIVIL
AVIATION COOPERATION

Enhancing State Communication Mechanism for Civil Aviation

According to ICAO standards, all civil aircraft are required to
submit their flight information before and during their flights
for safety purposes.100 There could be no objection from that
aircraft to submit the information since its absence would cause
an overflown State to return the flight or, in the worst scenario,
to intercept the aircraft as part of its national security measures.101 In that regard, Article 37 of the Chicago Convention
stipulates that states collaborate to secure “the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures,
and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and
auxiliary services.”102
However, States agreed to the principle of freedom of navigation and use on the high seas established under customary international law and later codified under UNCLOS.103 It must be
noted that while the high seas are free for navigation and use,
anticipatory defense zones have been set up and encroach on
the high seas for the sake of national security.104 Therefore, the
optimal measure to balance the freedom of flight with the principle of due regard to the coastal State would be to facilitate
confidence-building measures, from bilateral to multilateral,
that would function as a consistent liaison mechanism which the
Chagos Award Tribunal had also considered ideal to execute the
principle of due regard.
For instance, in June 2018, Japan and China agreed on a maritime–aerial communication mechanism to avert unintended
100 See Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Rules of the Air,
supra note 47, at 3-4 (Rule 3.3.1).
101 See id. at APP 2-1.
102 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 37.
103 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 87.
104 See, e.g., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., MARITIME ZONES AND
BOUNDARIES, https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html [https://perma.cc/
LU5M-KC7S] (Sept. 3, 2021).
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clashes in the East China Sea.105 The mechanism was initially
agreed to in 2007, and recently, discussions have resumed and
expanded to improve communication and crisis management,
which serve as confidence-building mechanisms.106
Although the mechanism primarily focuses on averting unintended military clashes in the East China Sea, both sides agreed
in 2015 to expand the mechanism to air activities and envisioned it being used in their respective EEZs, high seas, and
ADIZs.107 Moreover, as non-military activities are increasing in
the region, the agreed annual meetings would be expected to
include considerations for maritime law enforcement and civil
aviation as a whole.108 As for the 2018 agreement, Japan and
China further agreed to use direct communications between vessels and aircraft using both the Code for Unplanned Encounters
at Sea (CUES)109 and the Chicago Convention, indicating future
cooperation to manage civil aviation risks when necessary.110
Another useful tool to facilitate communication between
States concerning flights on international waters would be to
sign and actively participate in International Aeronautical and
105 Japan, China Launch Maritime-Aerial Communication Mechanism, MAINICHI
(June 8, 2018), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180608/p2a/00m/0na/
002000c [https://perma.cc/X9QD-7BCW].
106 See James Manicom, James J. Przystup & John Bradford, Japan-China Maritime Confidence Building and Communications Mechanisms, PACNET CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Aug. 20, 2013), www.cigionline.org/articles/japan-chinamaritime-confidence-building-and-communications-mechanisms/ [https://
perma.cc/PRE4-G3H6]; Marta McLellan Ross, The Japan-China Maritime and Air
Communication Mechanism: Operational and Strategic Considerations, JAPAN INST.
INT’L AFFS. 1 (June 30, 2015), https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/
150630_Ms_Ross_ECS.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA7V-7EFE].
107 See Ross, supra note 106, at 1, 3.
108 See id. at 3.
109 The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) was originally promulgated in 1999, based on international legal and navigational rules to promote
safe naval activities when vessels were unexpectedly encountered at sea. See Anh
Duc Ton, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and Its Practical Limitations in the East
and South China Seas, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. MARITIME & OCEAN AFFS. 227, 229 (2017).
The CUES is subject to regular review, and an updated version signed by twentyone nations became effective in 2014. Id. at 229–30; Document: Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea, USNI News (June 17, 2014, 3:16 PM), https://news.usni.org/
2014/06/17/document-conduct-unplanned-encounters-sea [https://perma.cc/
Q6A6-87Y8]. However, the practical limitations of CUES 2014 are that it is voluntary, non-binding, and applies only to naval vessels with communication rules
that are independent of multinational maritime tactical signals (which is based
on the Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book, or MTP).
See Ton, supra note 109, at 231–32.
110 See MAINICHI, supra note 105.
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Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR), which is co-promulgated by the International Maritime Organization and ICAO.111
IAMSAR consists of three-volume manuals, providing “guidelines for a common aviation and maritime approach to organizing and providing search and rescue.”112
While search and rescue aim to enhance State management
concerning distressed vessels and individuals, cooperation between States in the region could also lead to positive development for the region’s security environment. For example, a
multinational Search and Locate (SAL) operation was conducted in the Java Sea after the crash of Air Asia flight QZ8501
in December 2014.113 The SAL operation was led by Indonesia
and included Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, the United States,
China, and Russia as parties.114 Improving SAR had been the
main focus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum on Maritime Security; accordingly,
ASEAN prioritized the agenda of improving SAR cooperation in
its regional security mechanisms in 2015.115 In this regard, ICAO
had also recognized in several meetings that civil–military cooperation would be effective in supporting air traffic services,
search and rescue operations, disaster relief, and humanitarian
assistance.116
2.

Technical Role of ICAO for Military–Civil Aviation Cooperation

Indeed, the civil aviation industry and ICAO itself have also
seriously considered that the establishment of national military
requirements could unduly restrict international civil aviation as
a whole. A working paper was presented at the Thirteenth Air
Navigation Conference of ICAO by the IATA and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA),
both private organizations that represent the industrial needs in
111 See Int’l Maritime Org., IAMSAR Manual (2019), www.imo.org/en/
OurWork/Safety/Pages/IAMSARManual.aspx [https://perma.cc/DF92-R3N8].
112 Id.
113 See Eva Pejsova, Asia: Disasters as Opportunities?, EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR
SEC. STUD., at 1 (Mar. 2015), publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/51eebad3251a-4dad-89a7-d7905d88bd1d.0001.01/DOC_1 [https://perma.cc/7KPE-6Y53].
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2.
116 See ICAO, Thirteenth Air Navigation Conference: Draft Report of Committee A on
Agenda Item 3, at 3-7, ¶ 3.25, ICAO Doc. AN-Conf/13-WP/303 (Oct. 15, 2018)
[hereinafter ICAO, Thirteenth Air Navigation Conference: Draft Report].
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civil aviation.117 In particular, the paper contained concerns
about the industrial burden and risk of military interventions,
specifically due to incoherent standards of requiring Air Defense Clearance (ADC) codes.118 The paper noted that, before
entering an ADIZ, an ADC was required to avoid possible interceptions by military authorities; some reports even indicated an
airline “showing 65 [percent] of their flights required multiple
attempts in order to obtain an ADC clearance number.”119
As several recommendations of regional conferences had also
stated, it is important that ICAO take active measures to reduce
civil and military gaps. For example, the most recent triennial
Assembly made several serious considerations on the matter,
calling upon contracting states to “cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in improving coordination between military and
civil communications systems and air traffic control agencies so
as to enhance the safety of international civil aviation during the
identification and interception of civil aircraft.”120 ICAO should
convene regional conferences to establish appropriate data sharing among military authorities concerning protocols for entering ADIZs, including ADCs. Regarding ADCs in particular,
ICAO had already expressed its view that there is a need for data
sharing among military authorities in the Asia–Pacific region according to the Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Plan, which would
make divergent ADC protocols obsolete.121
Moreover, ICAO should establish navigation standards and
rules that incorporate the military dimension to future versions
of the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP)122 by proposing a uni117 See ICAO, Thirteenth Air Navigation Conference: Working Paper Presented by the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Federation of Air
Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) on Establishment of Military Requirements and Restrictions on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc. AN-Conf/13-WP/295 (Sept. 28,
2018).
118 Id. at 2, ¶ 2.5.
119 Id. at 3, ¶ 2.10.
120 ICAO, Assembly Resolutions in Force, at I-12, ICAO Doc. 10140 (Oct. 4, 2019).
Appendix I of Assembly Resolution A40-4 had specifically suggested establishing
guidance on best practices for civil and military cooperation, including inviting
representatives of military authorities in their delegations. Id. at II-14 to -15.
121 See ICAO, Ninth Meeting of the South Asia/Indian Ocean ATM Coordination
Group, Working Paper presented by the Secretariat: Civil/Military Cooperation Update, at
8, ¶ 2.18, ICAO Doc. SAIOACG/9-WP29 (Mar. 26–29, 2019).
122 The ICAO promulgates the GANP as the highest air navigation strategic
document for facilitating enhanced communication with technical and high-level
managers from a global to national level. In line with the Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept (GATMOC) and the Manual on Air Traffic Man-
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form protocol for civil flights when entering the ADIZ. According to the Thirteenth Air Navigation Conference of ICAO, the
Air Navigation Committee decided that ICAO should develop a
mechanism to collaborate with the military community and further incorporate the military dimension, including civil–military
cooperation and collaboration, in future editions of GANP.123 It
is important to note that on the high seas, the only means of
imposing restrictions on civil aircraft other than by specific provisions of international law would be ICAO’s standards and
rules.124
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has reviewed the legitimacy of ADIZs from both a
legal and political perspective, only to summarize that any legal
position cannot completely put weight on the freedom of flight
against national security and vice versa. In particular, the principle of due regard does not completely support the argument of
the coastal State to limit the freedom of flight beyond its territorial airspace arbitrarily. Rather, the principle itself obliges both
the overflying and overflown State to engage in communication
to consider the interests of each other as comity, which has been
the main pillar of the international community since the Peace
of Westphalia.125
The core issue of this conflict is that civil aviation must not be
taken hostage to the establishment and divergent standards of
ADIZs and other national security measures. As reviewed above,
States have established a zone or altered their existing procedures and have caused technical disorder in the airline industry,
leading to flight delays, cancellations, or even political conflicts
agement System Requirements, it allows for different stakeholders to access and
use the information that is most relevant to their area of interest at the different
levels. See ICAO, Global Air Navigation Plan Strategy: Introduction (2021),
www4.icao.int/ganpportal/GanpDocument#/lessons/sKX__rle6SOH4QcBvYFbc
jG-V4xaWosA?_k=Meuozu [https://perma.cc/CYJ3-7G4U].
123 See ICAO, Thirteenth Air Navigation Conference: Draft Report, supra note 116, at
3-9 (Recommendation 3.4/1).
124 See Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 12 (“Over the high seas, the rules
in force shall be those established under this Convention.”). In this regard, Paul
Dempsey finds this unique characteristic of the Chicago Convention as “hard
law,” designating ICAO with “lawmaking authority over 72% of the Earth’s surface.” DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 105.
125 See Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1543, 1566 (2009).
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between States. These conflicts would threaten airlines that have
agreed to services through numerous air-services agreements.
The principle of due regard is a reciprocal guide of State behavior, in which a State might lose its case if it does not have
material evidence of communication and meetings, as shown in
the Chagos case. Technical confidence-building measures must
be utilized to facilitate communication between States by cooperating in search and rescue missions, and identifying a regional
security environment for development. Also, ICAO’s technical
leadership is required to review divergent ADIZ procedures and
convene a practical agreement among States to consolidate
overlapping and excessive procedures to achieve uniformity in
civil aviation.

